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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Republic of Adaria, on one side, and the Republic of Bobbia, the
Kingdom of Cazalia, the Commonwealth of Dingoth, the State of Ephraim and
the Kingdom of Finbar, jointly on the other, have submitted by Special
Agreement their differences concerning the Rotian Union, and transmitted a
copy thereof to the Registrar of the Court pursuant to article 40(1) of the
Statute. Therefore, both parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ
pursuant to Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT
The Republic of Adaria respectfully asks this Court:
A) Whether or not Respondents have violated international legal
obligations owed to Adaria by denying Adaria membership in
the Rotian Union;
B) Whether or not Respondents have standing to make any claim
concerning Adarian actions with respect to the Rotian Union
representative office, its property, or its personnel;
C) Whether or not Adaria violated international law concerning the
immunity of diplomatic missions by seizing the premises,
property, or personnel ofthe Rotian Union representative office;
and
D) Whether or not the National Industry Act constitutes an illegal
expropriation of Adarmoire and the other privatized concerns
under international law.
HI. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Republic of Adaria is a developing State with a parliamentary
democratic form of government. Traditionally dependant on agricultural
production, over the last years it had experienced a growth of the manufacturer
industry led by state-owned enterprises.
Adarian population consists of 40 million ethnic Adarians and 2 million
ethnic Sophians. Although sharing religious, idiomatic and cultural differences,
the Sophian minority has always been a primary concern for Adarian
authorities. In light of this, the Parliament had enacted the 1975 Sophians
Protection Act (SPA) aimed at protecting its craft production and farm-based
economy by providing for governmental subsidies and benefits to small
businesses, as well as discounts in basic public services.
On December 2, 1995, the Republic of Adaria applied for entering into the
Rotian Union, an international organization created and integrated by
Respondents. In accordance with the Union's rules governing accession of new
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members into the Organization, the Commission performed a four-years
investigation and research of Adarian economy. At the end of this endeavour,
on December 6, 1999, a recommendation was submitted to the Council
containing a series of three conditions upon which fulfilment Adaria was
suitable for election as a member. As it was the Commission's view that Adaria
would successfully accomplish the requirements, said organ urged the Council
to celebrate an Accession Agreement with Adaria.
After ratifying the aforementioned recommendation, the Council entrusted
the Commission with the celebration of the Agreement, which was finally
concluded between Adaria and that organ on 1 October 2001. This instrument
reproduced the three conditions previously established by the Commission.
Specifically, Adaria had to: "a) reduce its public debt owed to non-member
States, b) privatize State-owned monopolies, and eliminate government support
payment to small, privately-owned businesses."
Additionally, it stipulated the creation of a Delegation of the Rotian Union
in Adarian territory aimed at facilitating the accession process. The deadline
for accomplishment of the three conditions was set for November 1, 2005.
After informing of the Agreement to the Adarian citizenship, the
government began to undertake drastic changes in its economy in order to
comply with the three requirements formulated by the Rotian Union.
Specifically, it increased ad valorem taxes in every sector in order to reduce its
foreign debt, and privatized a great number of public companies, which were
all immediately acquired by corporations established in the Respondent's
States.
With the view to integrate the recently purchased companies into its global
network, the new owners took the measure of laying off some 20,000
employees. Additionally, they reduced a great number of supply contracts
established with Sophian handicraft manufacturers and eliminated the price
discounts to which they were beneficiaries under the SPA. The resultant
increase of prices in basic utilities such as water and power left a great portion
of the Sophian population in poor life conditions.
In order to comply with the third demand established by the Accession
Agreement, Adarian government had to eliminate all subsidies to Sophian
manufacturers, which, as informed by the Department of Social Studies of the
Adarian National University, contributed to the impossibility to operate farm
activities originated by the price increase in supplies.
With the idea of palliating this crisis, Prime Minister Mesmim announced
the creation of a public works programme in the northeast region of Adaria.
However, in spite of the publicly recognized good-willingness of this measure,
it resulted on a failure as no significant portion of the Sophian population was
willing to participate.
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Over 2004 and 2005, Adarian government continued to take measures in
order to accomplish the objectives laid down in the Accession Agreement.
Disregarding inner voices that opposed the idea of entering the Rotian Union,
the government of Prime Minister Mesmin insisted on his endeavour, with the
confidence that upon completion, Adaria would effectively become a member.
Finally, as expected, on November 10, 2005, the Commission Delegation
established in Ilsa informed the Council that Adaria had fully complied with all
the requirements, and urged on its accession as a member of the Rotian Union.
However, on 20 November 2005, the Council adopted decision N' 05/376
thereby declining Adarian accession to the Rotian Union on the unforeseen
basis that the conditions in which the Sophian population had entered after
implementation of the economic measures required for said accession were
"inconsistent with membership in the Union."
Social discontent and political reaction immediately followed Adarian
denial of membership. At a press conference held in November 6, 2005, Prime
Minister Mesmin informally protested against the Council's decision and called
on the Rotian Union to fulfil the promise it had undergone.
A few days later, on 15 November 2005, an investigation on the represen-
tatives of the Rotian Union Delegation began. It had come to the authorities
attention that during the period in which the aforementioned delegation was
established in Ilsa, it had made financial contributions to parliamentary
candidates in violation of Section 17-1031 of the Adarian Criminal Code. Such
norms specifically forbid such donations by foreign business or corporate
entities.
The following day, agents of the Justice Ministry delivered a duly issued
subpoena to the Delegation Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Uriah Heep, ordering
to handle all electronic or paper bank records concerning transactions within
Adarian territory. Following his public denial, he was arrested and taken into
custody on the charges of violating Adarian Criminal Code Section 17-1031
and impeding due exercise of justice.
Seizure of the bank records withheld by Mr. Heep ultimately took place
the following day when, following an order form the local magistrate, Justice
Ministry officials entered into the Delegation's office.
As it was suspected, the recovered documents demonstrated that
representatives of the Rotian Union had indeed violated Adarian Criminal Code
by illegally financing political candidates.
Finally, on December 19, the Adarian Parliament approved the National
Industry Act (NIA), forbidding the exportation of proceeds obtained by all
companies privatized after ratification of the Adarian Accession Agreement,
and repatriating of any of their assets. Such measure was conceived as a way
to mitigate the devastating effects that the economic process ending in the
denial of Adarian membership into the Rotian Union had produced.
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Following contestation in national courts, Adarian Supreme Tribunal
confirmed the economic measure inasmuch as it considered that no expropria-
tion can occur when property and assets remain in the territory and within the
patrimony of the companies.
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
The Republic of Adaria submits before this High court that the Republic
of Bobbia, the Kingdom of Cazalia, the Commonwealth of Dingoth, the State
of Ephraim and the Kingdom of Finbar have violated international legal
obligations by denying Adarian membership into the Rotian Union. Secondly,
Adaria claims that the Respondents do not have standing to make any claim
concerning Adarian action with respect to the Rotian Union Representative
Office, its property or its personnel. Additionally, it is submitted that Adaria
did not violate international law concerning the immunity of diplomatic
missions by seizing the premises, property or personnel of the Rotian Union
Representative Office. Finally, Adaria claims that the National Industry Act
does not constitute an illegal expropriation of Adarmoire and the other
privatized concerns under international law.
In respect of the denial of membership to the Rotian Union, Adaria
submits that the Respondents have violated international legal obligations owed
to Adaria, given that such denial because it violated the terms of the Adarian
Accession Agreement, as well as the procedure for admission established in
Adaria's favor. Futhermore, Respondents are liable for the acts of the Rotian
Union that affected Adaria, because generally Member States are liable for the
acts of the International Organizations of which they form part and in particular
because the Respondents led Adaria to rely on their liability and because the
illegal conduct of the Rotian Union belongs to the field of the Member's
delegated competences.
In connection with the Respondents standing to bring international claims
in respect of the Rotian Union Representative Office, its property or personnel,
it is maintained, firstly, that local remedies available in Adaria have not been
exhausted. Furthermore, the obligations concerning privileges and immunities
would be owed to the Rotian Union, being it the only entity entitled to bring an
international claim. Further, it is submitted that member States cannot bring an
international claim for a breach of such obligations, neither on behalf of the
organization, nor in their own right. Lastly, it is maintained that Respondents
cannot bring the aforementioned claim as they have delegated foreign policy
matters in the organization.
As regards international law obligations concerning the immunities of the
Rotian Union representative office, its property or personnel, Adaria submits
that no breach attributable to it has occurred. On the first place, diplomatic
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privileges and immunities are not applicable to the Rotian Union representation.
Furthermore, it is argued that no conventional or customary law imposes Adaria
the obligation to provide privileges and immunities to the Rotian Union office
and that if any such rule were held to exist it would only bind the Members of
the Organization. Finally, it is submitted that, in case Adaria's is held to be
bound by such rules, no breach of the concerned obligations would have
occurred because Adaria's actions fall within accepted exceptions to them.
Finally, with respect to National Industry Act, Adaria claims, firstly, that
Respondents have not exhausted local remedies with regard to all the privatized
concerns and thus, they can only exercise diplomatic protection in Adarmoire's
case. Secondly, it is submitted that the National Industry Act does not amount
to an expropriation, given that only forcible takings of property are considered
as such in international law and that all other measures that affect property
rights, without constituting an actual taking of property, are legal. Alterna-
tively, it is claimed that the National Industry Act does not produce the required
effect on the privatized concerns' property rights as to be deemed an indirect
expropriation. Lastly, Adaria submits that the National Industry Act is a valid
regulatory measure that complies with the requirements of non-discrimination,
public purpose and temporary duration and that consequently, it does not
require payment of compensation
V. PLEADINGS
A. Respondent States Have Violated International Legal Obligations Owed
To Adaria By Denying Adaria Membership In The Rotian Union.
Under international law, treaties must be performed in good faith.' The
Rotian Union's [hereinafter R.U.] denial of Adarian membership is inconsistent
with the Adarian Accession Agreement [hereinafter A.A.A.] and it engages
Respondents' international responsibility.
1. Denial Of Membership Under The Circumstances Of This Case Is
Inconsistent With The Obligations Undertaken Under The AAA.
a. Denial of membership violates the terms of the Adarian Accession
Agreement to the Rotian Union Treaty.
An organization cannot make consent for admission dependent on
conditions other than those expressly specified in the pertinent treaty.2 The
I. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art.26 [hereinafter
V.C.L.T.]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
between International Organizations, May 1986, 25 ILM 543, art.26 [hereinafter 1986 V.C.L.T.].
2. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948 1.C.J. 57, 65
(Dec. 12)
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A.A.A. established that Adaria was eligible for admission to the R.U. after
accomplishing three specific conditions.3 Having Adaria met them, the R.U.
rejected its application on grounds not expressly contemplated in the treaty.'
Hence, the denial is inconsistent with international law.
The reference that Adaria would only be "eligible" does not affect such
conclusion. In ascertaining what "eligible" comprises, due regard must be paid
to the rules set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,5 for not
only do they reflect customary rules on the issue,6 that extend to International
Organizations' instruments,7 but also all parties to this case have ratified it.'
In this vein, even if the ordinary meaning of the term "eligible" may imply
a certain power of the Council to decide on Adaria's application, such margin
of appreciation must be interpreted in good faith and has to be placed in
context, including the common intention of the treaty as a whole, its object and
its spirit.9 Even if the ordinary meaning of "eligible" is broader than that
provided by the context, the latter should prevail.'°
The purpose of the A.A.A. was "to facilitate the successful integration of
Adaria into the RU."'" Then, any impediment had to be construed restrictively,
as this type of treaties do not create obligations only for the State applying for
membership but also for the organization concerned. 2
Furthermore, the context reveals that the only conditions for admission are
those established in § 1. Thus, the Council's discretion must be circumscribed
to assessing the fulfillment of those requisites, but not to the inclusion of other
considerations, especially when such developments were envisioned by the
Parliament prior to the conclusion of the A.A.A. 13 and the Treaty was
nonetheless concluded.
3. Compromis, Annex I, art. 1.
4. Compromis, # 28.
5. V.C.L.T., supra note 1.
6. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3), para. 41; M.SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 937 (2003).
7. Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Adv. Op., 1996 I.C.J. 66
(July 8), para 19.
8. Compromis #40.
9. V.C.L.T., supra note 1, art. 31; South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South
Africa), Preliminary Objections, 1962 ICJ 319, (Dec. 21), 336; H.Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and
the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48 (1949), 80.-
10. Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros-Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, (Sept.25), para. 142, South
West Africa (Preliminary Objections), supra note 9, 336
11. Compromis, Annex If.
12. Cfr. P.SANDS & P.KLEIN, BowETT's LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 539 (2001).
13. Compromis #15 & #16.
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Finally, resort to relevant rules of international law 14 confirms the
aforementioned conclusion, for according to the ut magis rule, where conditions
are enumerated they must be deemed exhaustive. 5
Consequently, the denial of membership grounded on the Sophians'
situation exceeds the power of the Council to decide on Adaria's application,
entailing a violation of the A.A.A.
b. The refusal to admit Adaria was effected in violation of the procedure
established in its favor.
The Treaty Establishing the Rotian Union [hereinafter T.R.U] confers the
right tojoin the Union to every State, subject to a detailed admission procedure.
The A.A.A. established that Adaria would be eligible for admission, "pursuant
to Article 11, Section 6.''16 Thus, the R.U. incorporated into the A.A.A. the
process provided for in the aforementioned clause, namely, the decision of the
Council after obtaining the opinion of the Parliament. 7
Furthermore, the admission procedure contemplated in the T.R.U. con-
stitutes a stipulation established in Adaria's favor. Indeed, under the V.C.L.T
a treaty may provide a right to a third State if the parties to it intend to accord
such right and the third party assents thereto. 8 Such assent is presumed, 9 inas-
much as existence of a substantive right,2° or enjoyment of beneficial conse-
quences" is asserted. In this connection, the possibility of becoming a party to
a treaty by virtue of its own provisions is generally accepted as a right for third
states.22
Hence, resolution N0 05/376 rejecting Adaria's application without the
Parliament's prior opinion23 is contrary to the admission procedure as this Court
14. V.C.L.T., supra note 1, Art. 31.3.(c).
15. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, supra note 2, 62-63;
G.G.Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court ofJustice: International Organizations
and Tribunals, 29 BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 1 (1952), 25.
16. Compromis, Annex II, para. 1.
17. Compromis, Annex I, art. 11 para. 11.
18. V.C.L.T., supra note 1, art.36; S.S.Wimbledon (U.K, France, Italy, Japan v. Germany), 1923
P.C.I.J., (ser. A) N' 1 (June 28), 22; E.Jim~nez de Arfchaga, Treaty stipulations in favor ofthirdstates, 50
AM.J.INT'L.L. 338 (1956), 355-357.
19. V.C.L.T., supra note 1, art.32.1.
20. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) N' 46 (June 7), 147-148
21. Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties (Treaties and Third States), 1960 Yb.I.L.C. IL 76.
22. Ibid. p.82.
23. Compromis #28.
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has found on a similar situation.24 Therefore, the Council's omission constitutes
a breach of an obligation under the A.A.A and of the T.R.U.'s stipulation in
Adaria's favor.
2. Respondents are liable for the acts of the Rotian
Union vis-A-vis third parties.
Even if denial of membership was issued by the R.U., Bobbia, Cazalia,
Dingoth, Ephraim and Finbar, are still liable, since member states retain respon-
sibility for the conduct of that organization. In the alternative, their responsi-
bility arises from the fact that they (i) made Adaria rely on their liability and (ii)
delegated their foreign affairs on the organization, thereby circumventing their
own obligations.
a. Respondent States are liable for the acts of the Rotian Union.
Unless specifically limited or excluded, member States of an international
organization are responsible for the acts of the latter vis-6-vis third states.25 This
rule is derived from legal reasoning based upon general principles of law,26 as
this Court has often done.27
Responsibility of States for acts of international organizations is based on
the same premises governing state responsibility.2" Hence, relevant principles,
such as the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts29 should be
considered. In this vein, States are responsible for bringing to life an inter-
24. Competence-oftheGeneral Assembly for the Admission ofa Stateto the United Nations, 1950
I.C.J. 4 (March 3), 9.
25. M.HIRSCH, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES
148 (1995); see I.Brownlie, The responsibility of States for the acts of international organizations in
M.RAGAzZI(ED.), INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 355-
362(2005); and S.Yee, The responsibility of States Members of an international organization for its conduct
as a result of membership or their normal conduct associated with membership in M.RAGAZZI(ED.),
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 435-454 (2005).
26. I.Brownlie, in M.RAGAZZI(ED.),supra note 25,357; and S.Yee, inM.RAGAZZI(ED.),supra note
25,443-446.
27. North Sea Continental Shelf(F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), 46 para.
83-84; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38
(June 14), paras. 46-48; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 7, para. 74.
28. Report of the ILC on the Work of its 54th Sess., UN DOC. A/CN.4/529, para. 200; I.Brownlie,
in M.RAGAZZI (ED.), supra note 25, 360.
29. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May24),
29; Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros-Project supra note 10, 54; Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83, Jan. 28th, 2002, [hereinafter Res. 56/83], art. 1.
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national organization, and for all the resultant responsibility thereof,3" since it
would be unacceptable for them to shelter their acts behind the legal personality
of the organization,"' as was expressed during the debate of this issue at the
General Assembly.32
State practice confirms the existence of the aforementioned rule. Indeed,
States-when creating international organizations-have included clauses
limiting their liability in more than twenty constituent instruments.33 The
consistency and continuity of this practice is shown by the fact that after the
default of the International Tin Council other six instruments establishing
organizations were accordingly adopted.34
Further, member States of international organizations have supplied the
funds to reach a settlement with creditors35 thereby tacitly admitting their
liability or full liability for all its debts when they decided to wind up the
organization.36
Additionally, in the frame of the European Community, treaties with non-
member States result in mixed agreements to apportion clearly the
responsibility, in the absence of which, States are all jointly liable.37
Furthermore, judicial decisions have confirmed the existence of this rule
when affirming that "[i]n the absence of any provision expressly or impliedly
30. S.Yee, in M.RAGAZZI(ED.),supra note 25,444; W.E.Holder, Can International Organizations
be Controlled? Accountability and Responsibility, 97 Am. SOC'Y INT'L L.PROC. 231 (2003), 234-235.
31. M.HIRSCH, supra note 25, 136; I.SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAw 121 (1987).
32. Summary record of the Ilth meeting of the Sixth Committee, Oct. 24th 2005, U.N.G.A.
A/C.6/60/SR. 11, para. 53.
33. C.F.AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATiONS 427(2005); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, Dec. 10th
1982, Article 174 (4); Agreement of the I.B.R.D, at http:\\web.worldbank.org, art. 2(6); Agreement
Establishing the Interamerican Investment Corporation, available at http:\\www.iic.int, art. 2(6); Convention
establishing the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation available at http:\\www.iaigc.org, art. 7(4).
34. H.G.SCHERMERS & N.M.BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAw §1589 (2003);
International Cocoa Agreement, at http:\\www.icco.org, art. 23; International Coffee Agreement, at
http:\\www.ico.org, art. 26.
35. M.HIRSCH, supra note 25, 126-127; Current Developments: Public International Law, 39
INT'L&COMP.L.Q. 923, 945 (1990).
36. l.Seidl-Hohenveldem, Piercing the Corporate Veil of International Organizations: The
International Tin Council Case in the English Court of Appeals, 32 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAW 43
(1989), 51-52.
37. P.J.Kuijper & E.Paasivirta, Further Exploring International Responsibility: the European
Community andthe lLC's Project on Responsibility ofInternational Organizations, I INT'L ORGANIZATIONS
LAW REVIEW 111 (2004), 122-123; Case 316/91, Parliament v. Council, E.C.J., 1994 E.C.R. 1-625, para. 29.
[Vol. 14:1
2007] Distinguished Brief
excluding the liability of the four States, this liability subsists ... This rule
flows from general principles of law and from good faith".38
The Treaty establishing the Rotian Union does not contain any provision
denying liability of member states. Consequently, Respondents are liable for
the conduct of the organization.
b. Respondent States are liable for the acts of the Rotian Union because
they led Adaria to rely on their liability.
Members of an international organization are responsible vis-ii-vis third
States for the acts of the organization if they have led the injured party to rely
on their responsibility. 9 In determining so, the surrounding circumstances
should be examined globally.4"
In the instant case, the final decision on membership applications rests
with the Council.41 The fact that each member state is represented there by its
Head of Government,42 coupled with the requirement of unanimous vote for
admissions,43 reflects the intention of respondents to keep a high degree of
control over the decision, being that a strong presumption of liability,44 as it
casts doubt on the sufficient independence of the organ concerned.45 Other
relevant factors are the small size of the organization,46 and the fact that the
Parliament warned about their impact on the Sophians' situation47 making it
apparent that respondents would not deny liability for any related circumstance.
Moreover, under the T.R.U., respondents ensured the fulfillment of
obligations arising from the Treaty or resulting instruments, 48 a situation
38. Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization, 80 INT'L LAw.REP. 596
(1989), 613.
39. Report of the I.L.C., 58th Sess., U.N.G.A. A/61/10 [hereinafter I.L.C. Report 58rd, 286-291;
Fourth Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, Addendum, U.N.G.A. A/CN.4/564/Add.2,
para. 92; I.Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 36, 47; Westland Helicopters Ltd., supra note 38, para. 56;
Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd. Appellants v. Department of Trade and Industry, 3 All ER 307, 331.
40. I.L.C. Report 58rd, supra note 39, 290; C.F.AMERASINGHE, supra note 33, 435; I.Seidl-
Hohenveldem, supra note 36, 47.
41. Compromis, Annex I, art. 11.6.
42. Ibid., art. 5.2.
43. Ibid.,art. 11.6.
44. Maclaine Watson & Co., supra note 39, 331.
45. First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, March 26th 2003, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/532, para. 19.
46. Summary record of the 12th meeting of the 6th Committee, Nov. 23th 2005, U.N.G.A.
A/C.6/60/SR. 12 para. 52.
47. Compromis #16.
48. Compromis Annex I, art. 10(a).
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specially contemplated by the European Court of Justice in a similar case,4 9
specially when no clause excluding members' liabilities was included."
For these reasons, Adaria relied that Respondents would comply with the
obligations under the A.A.A. and bear any responsibility arising thereof.
Consequently, Respondents must be held liable for the organization's rejection
of Adaria's application for membership.
c. Respondent States are liable for the acts of the Rotian Union because
they delegated their foreign affairs to the organization.
Member states are liable for the conduct of the international organizations
in the fields of delegated competences," since States cannot evade their
responsibility for what would be their ordinary competence by delegating it to
an organization. 2
In the case at bar, Respondents have delegated many of their competences
to the R.U.,53 among them, the conduction of their foreign policy,54 including
the capacity to conclude international treaties.5 Indeed, it could be argued that
the R.U. acts both in law and in fact as the agent of the Respondent States.56
Adaria's process of admission to the R.U. is within the competences that those
States delegated to the organization. Thus, Respondent States are liable for any
wrongful act emerging from such process. Otherwise they would circumvent
all their international responsibilities by merely deferring issues to another legal
person.
49. Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, E.C.J., 1987, E.C.R. 03719 (Sept. 30), recital
11.
50. C.F.AMERASINGHE, supra note 33, 436.
51. I.L.C. Report 58rd, supra note 39, 283-286; Fourth Report on Responsibility of International
Organizations, Addendum, U.N.G.A. A/CN.4/564/Add.1, para. 64-74.
52. P.J.Kuijper & E.Paasivirta, supra note 37, 130-13 1; Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, (2000)
30 E.H.R.R. 261, 287 para. 67; Matthews v. United Kingdom, (1999) 28 E.H.R.R. 361, 396 para. 32;
Bosphorus v. Ireland, (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 1, para. 154.
53. Compromis #6, #7 & #9; Annex I, art. 2 & 8.2.
54. Compromis#1 & #12.
55. Compromis Annex 1, art. 11.
56. Institut de Droit Intemationale, Les consequences juridiques pour les Etats membres de
I Tnex&ution par des organisations internationales de leurs obligations envers des tiers, Article 5, at
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/1995_lis_02_fr.pdf
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B. Respondents Do Not Have Standing To Make Any Claim Concerning
Applicant's Actions With Respect To The Rotian Union Representative
Office, Its Property, Or Its Personnel.
1. Respondents cannot espouse the Rotian Union claim because local
remedies in Adaria have not been exhausted.
International organizations are generally recognized the capacity to
institute legal proceedings in national courts.57 Therefore, compliance with the
rule of exhaustion of local remedies when claiming for damages inflicted to its
delegation or agents, as it is analogically required for the exercise of diplomatic
protection," is required from international organizations.59
The R.U. has not exhausted local remedies available in Adaria and,
therefore, both the Union and the Respondents are precluded from resorting to
this Court with regard to this issue.
2. Respondents do not have standing because obligations concerning the
Rotian Union privileges and immunities, if any, were owed to the
organization and its Members cannot espouse the claim.
a. The alleged obligations would have been owed to the Rotian Union and
thus only the organization would be entitled to invoke Adaria's
responsibility,
As a corollary of the attribution of international personality an inter-
national organization is capable of possessing rights and obligations of its
own,6" including the capacity to invoke the responsibility of States for inter-
nationally wrongful acts.6 Furthermore, it is generally established that only the
entity to which an obligation is owed possesses that capacity.62 Therefore, the
57. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UnitedNations, I U.N.T.S. 15,13 February
1946, Section 1; ILO Constitution, Article 39, 15 U.N.T.S. 35; Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 Article 211; Fourth Report on Relations Between States and International
Organizations, Y.B. INT'L L.COMM'N., Vo.11, 153, Article 5, A/CN.4/424, P.SANDS & P.KLEIN, supra note
12, 485.
58. Mavrommantis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2, 1924, 12.
59. C.Eagleton, International Organization and the Law of Responsibility, 76 RCADI 319, 351
(1950); A.REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 127 (1995).
60. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. 174 179 [hereinafter: Reparations]; R.HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 46 (1995).
61. Reparations, supra note 60, 179; M.Hardy, Claims by International Organizations in respect
of Injuries to their Agents, 37 BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 516 (1961), 521-522; M.Rama Montaldo, International
Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations, 44 BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 111 (1970),
130; D.Akande, International Institutions, in M.EVANS(ED.), INTERNATIONAL LAw 274 (2003).
62. Report of the ILC on the Work of its 53rd Sess., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, UN
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capacity to invoke a breach of an obligation owed to it must be understood as
exclusive in respect of the international organization concerned.
This assertion is endorsed by international practice, as international
organizations generally present international claims themselves,63 as this Court
has recognized when stating that, in bringing a claim for damages suffered by
its agent, an international organization does so by invoking the breach of an
obligation towards itself.'4
In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding Uriah Heep's reception
into Adarian territory, the presentation of credentials before governmental
authorities,65 and, most relevantly, the terms of the AAA 66 dictate that, if any
obligations regarding privileges and immunities were held to bind Adaria, they
would only be owed to the R.U. and not to its members. As one authority has
expressed in the most conclusive terms:
"In practice, all Organizations invoke or waive (as the case may be)
privileges and immunities on behalf of their officials, and they, or the host
State, could hardly accept a transfer of these functions to the State of which the
officials are nationals. This is especially evident if the privileges and
immunities are based upon a headquarters or host agreement to which only the
Organization, not it several Member States, are parties."67
Moreover, as in the case at bar Uriah Heep is not a national of any of the
member States,6" less reason for a transfer of the kind may exist.
Therefore, only the R.U. would be capable of invoking Adaria's inter-
national responsibility and the Respondent States lack standing in this regard.
b. Respondents cannot espouse a claim on behalf of the
Rotian Union or any of its organs.
Member States of the R.U. are precluded from representing the latter in
order to bring an international claim. The organization is, at least in this area,
an international subject with enough capacity to act on the international plane
by itself.
GAOR56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN DOC. A/56/10, [hereinafter UN DOC. A/56/10], Article 42, paragraphs
1,2 & 3.
63. G.A. Res.365 (IV), 1 December 1949; UNESCO-France Arbitration Award, 14 January 2003,
107 R.G.D.I.P. 221 (2003).
64. Reparations, supra note 60, 182.
65. Compromis #18
66. Compromis, Annex I, #3
67. F.Seyersted, International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations. Do Their
Capacities Depend Upon Their Constitutions? 4 INDIAN J.INT'L.L. 6 (1964).
68. Clarifications #3
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There is no rule of international law enabling States to espouse a claim on
behalf of an international organization and no special provision on the issue has
been included on the codification of international responsibility of international
organizations.69
Lack of practice in this connection confirms the aforementioned conclu-
sion. States can only act on the international plane on behalf of an international
organization, either when the latter is devoid of international legal personality,
70
or in the specific case foreseen by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations, 7' which is unrelated to the present circumstances.
The fact that the Statute of this Court72 does not permit international
organizations to become parties to contentious proceedings does not imply that
its member States should be entitled to represent it, even if this resulted in the
R.U. being incapable of enforcing its rights as this Court has already recognized
that "in the international field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the
last resort be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than
the exception."73
Furthermore, that path would result in the unacceptable consequence of the
member States disregarding the international personality of the organization.74
Certainly, this would collide against elemental principles of international law,
such as good faith,75 and the legitimate interests of Adaria76 in having
contracted with the Union.
69. Report of the ILC, 55th Sess., A/CN.4/532; Report of the ILC, 55th Sess., A/CN.4/541; Report
of the ILC, 57th Sess., A/CN.4/553, Report of the ILC, 58th Sess., A/CN.4/564; Report of the ILC, 58th
Sess., A/CN.4/564/Add. 1.
70. Treaty of the European Union, Title 1, Article 1, Oct. 11, 1997, Offic. J. of the E.C. C325/5
(Dec. 24 2002); Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol signed on 23 November 1970 between the
European Economic Community and Turkey, Official Journal L 293, 29/12/1972, p. 4.; A.S.MULLER,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES 78 (1995); M.Gavouneli, M. International Law
Aspects of the European Union, 8 TUL.J.INT'L & COMP.L. 147 (2000), 149.
71. 1986 V.C.L.T., supra note 1, Article 66(2)(d).
72. I.C.J. Statute, June 26, 1945, 1060 U.S.T.S. 993, Article 34
73. South West Africa, supra note 9, para. 86.
74. M.SHAw, supra note 6, 243.
75. Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France, Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (December 20),
267; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N.Doc. A/8082 (1970).
76. J.Klabbers, Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law, in M.
KOSKENNIEMI(ED.), INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 237 (1998); C.Tomuschat, The
International Responsibility of the European Union, in E.CANNIzARO(ED.), THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN
ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 182 (2002).
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c. Additionally, Respondents do not have standing in their own right with
respect to Adaria's action in connection with the Rotian Union Legation
because they are not injured States.
Furthermore, Respondent States do not have standing to bring a claim in
their own right in connection with Adaria's action because they do not satisfy
the requirements set out by the international law of state responsibility in that
regard." Indeed, the Respondents cannot be considered as injured states"8 for
the purposes of invoking Adaria's responsibility and the rule for invoking
responsibility as a State other than the injured one is neither part of customary
international law nor applicable to this case.
d Respondents are not injured States as the alleged obligations were not
owed to them individually.
Under international law, a State can be considered injured if the breached
obligation was due to it on a bilateral basis.79 Clearly, such condition is
inexistent in the case at bar. No bilateral treaty exists between Adaria and
Respondents regarding the R.U. Legation, neither on privileges and immunities
whatsoever."0 Furthermore, no bilateral relation can emerge from the AAA as
it expressly indicates that the Legation would represent the interests of the
Commission and not of the five member States.
e. Respondents are not injured States because they were not specially
affected by the breach of an obligation owed to a group of States or the
international community as a whole nor was there a breach of an integral
obligation.
International responsibility can also be invoked by a State specially
affected by the breach of an obligation owed to a group of States.8 ' As all
member states of the R.U. are claiming together and on the same facts and
law, 2 no one is "affected by the breach in a way which distinguishes it from the
generality of other States to which the obligation is owed." 3 Certainly, neither
Uriah Heep's nationality nor an eventual detriment of the diplomatic relations
77. Res 56/83, supra note 29.
78. Res.56/83, supra note 29, Part Hm, Chap. 1.
79. UN DOC. A/56/10, supra note 62 Article 42, paragraph 6.
80. Clarifications # 12.
81. UN DOC. A/56/10, supra note 62, Article 42.
82. Compromis #38.
83. UN DOC. A/56/10, supra note 62, Article 42, paragraph 13.
84. Clarifications #3.
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of any of the member States with Adaria"5 provide a basis for such
differentiation.
Furthermore, in the case at bar no reciprocal obligations exist, so far as
member States do not owe Adaria any privilege or immunity under the AAA
thus precluding the possibility of invoking Adaria's responsibility on that basis.
f Neither can Respondents invoke Adarian responsibility as States other
than the injured State.
Finally, Respondents cannot invoke Adaria's responsibility by extensively
applying the provisions of Article 48 of Draft Articles on State Responsibility.86
Indeed, this provision is envisaged as a measure of progressive development
which does not amount to international customary law up to this date87 and the
privileges and immunities supposedly granted to the R.U. cannot be said to have
been instituted for the protection of a collective interest as it is the case with
environmental preservation, security of a region or freedom of navigation.88
g. In the alternative, Respondents are incapable of invoking Adaria's
responsibility by having delegated diplomatic and foreign policy matters in
the organization.
Respondent States are precluded from invoking Adaria's responsibility
because they have delegated diplomatic and foreign policy matters in the
Commission.89 The delegated powers go beyond the scope of those accorded
under article 4(1)(g) of the TRU as they have been expanded by way of practice
to cover the member States' own diplomatic and foreign relations.9"
This Court has previously held,9' and it has been endorsed by commenta-
tors,92 that the established practice of international organizations constitute
rules to which they must conform in the development of their international
activities. When said practice specifies functions or purposes of the organiza-
tions, they must be understood as duties they are called to exercise. 93 In the
85. Clarifications #6.
86. UN DOC. A/56/10, supra note 62, Article 42.
87. Ibid., Article 48, para. 12.
88. Ibid., Article 48, paragraph 5.
89. Compromis # 12
90. Compromis #12
91. Legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 22, Adv.Op., (June 21), para. 22.
92. P.SANDS & P.KLEIN, supra note 12, 456; C.F.AMERASINGHE, supra note 33, 55.
93. Reparations, supra note 60, 180.
20071
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
instant case, such practice bars Respondent States from bringing a claim on
grounds that no longer pertain to the scope of their capacities.
3. In the alternative, the Rotian Union and its Member States would be
precluded from bringing a claim due to the Rotian Union Legation illegal
activities in Adaria.
According to international law, a State cannot make a claim on behalf of
an injured national if he suffered injury as a result of engaging in improper
activities.94
Illegal conduct was proved to be carried out by Uriah Heep in the exercise
of his functions.95 Said conduct, bordering undue intervention 96 in Adarian
affairs, precludes both the R.U. and its Members from invoking Adarian
responsibility as it analogously contravenes the aforementioned rule.97
C. Applicant Did Not Violate International Law Concerning The Immunity
Of Diplomatic Missions By Seizing The Premises, Property, Or Personnel Of
The Rotian Union Representative Office.
The distinction between the privileges and immunities recognized to
diplomatic missions of States and those accorded International Organizations
is well established.9s The RU Representative Office cannot be assimilated to an
embassy or diplomatic mission and therefore the privileges and immunities
pertaining to them are not applicable. Furthermore, customary international law
does not require Adaria to vest the RU with privileges and immunities and, in
any event, Adaria's action would not be inconsistent with such rule under the
current circumstances.
94. P.MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1997);
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 1986 I.C.J. 14, Judgement,
27 June 1986, (Schwebel, dissenting opinion) 272; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., Series A/B,
No. 53, (Anzilotti dissenting opinion), 95.
95. Compromis #32
96. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, (Dec. 15), 35.
97. R.Higgins, Les consequences juridiques pour les Etats membres de l inexicution par des
organisations internationales de leurs obligations envers des tiers, 66-1 YEARBOOK OF THE INSTITUT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, Part IV, 2 (1995).
98. J.Kunz, Privileges and immunities of International Organizations, 41 AM.J.INT'L L. 828, 854
(1947); J.Lalive, L "immunite dejurisdiction des etats et des organisations internationales, 84 R.C.A.D.1205,
293 (1953); A.REiNISCH, supra note 59, 20&21.
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1. The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities accorded to Embassies and
Diplomats are not applicable to the RU Representative Office.
The RU Representative Office is not and cannot be assimilated to an
embassy or diplomatic mission of a foreign State. Indeed, analogies between
diplomatic or consular law and institutional immunities are not accepted.99
Consequently, diplomatic or consular law is not applicable to International
Organizations, whose system of privileges and immunities has received separate
treatment' 00 as it arises from different sources and has distinct characteristics. 01
Recognition as a diplomatic mission cannot be derived from the absence
of payment of property taxes by the R.U.'l 2 since Adarian law also exempts not-
for-profit organizations 3 and the Adarian Taxation Ministry has so qualified
the R.U. Legation."°
Pursuant to the AAA, 0 5 Mr. Heep was a representative of the R.U., an
International Organization. Thus, the whole body of law pertaining to diplo-
matic and consular immunity is per se inapplicable to them.
2. Additionally, neither treaty nor customary law require Adaria to grant
privileges and immunities to an international organization.
As regards privileges and immunities of international organizations, the
test is functional,"0 6 and they must emerge from relevant treaties 7 as no
99. P.SANDS & P.KLEIN(EDS.), supra note 12, 486 (2001); I.KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW, 153 (2002); G.H.Glenn et al., Immunities of International
Organizations, 22 VA.J.INT'L L. 247, 266 (1982); Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2, 13 UNCIO
Doc- 933, IV/242(2), 704 (1945).
100. UN Doc. A/CN.4/304 (1977), A/CN.4/SER.A/1977.Add.! (Part I); UN Doc. A/CN.4/311
(1978), UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.1 (Part 1); UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.383, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1985 Add. I (Part /Add.l); UN Doc. A/CN.4/432 (1990), UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add. 1 (Part 1); UN Doc. A/CN.4/439 (1991); UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991; GA Res.
47/33, 47 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49), 287-8, para. 7; UN Doc. A/47/49 (Vol. 1) (1993).
101. Explanatory Report by the sub-committee of the European Committee on Legal Co-operation,
in Resolution (69) 23 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1969).
102. Clarifications #5
103. Clarifications #4
104. Clarifications #5
105. Compromis, Annex II, §3
106. E.Fedder, The Functional Basis of International Privileges and Immunities: A New Concept
in International Law and Organization, 9 AM. U. L. REv. 60, (1960) p.6 0 .
107. P.MALANCZUK(ED.),supra note 94,127 (1997); International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc.,
(1998), 80 I.L.R. 30, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia BHD v. International Tin Council, High Court of Malaysia
(1987), 80 I.L.R. 24; Explanatory Report, supra note 101, 14.
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customary rule emerges from existent practice,' due to its inconsistency and
lack of opinio iuris.l09
Privileges and immunities accorded to International Organizations were
always developed on a conventional basis,"o leaving no place for custom,"' as
evinced by the discontinuance of the work of the ILC on the topic, explaining
that the existence of multilateral conventions and host agreements turned any
codification on the subject unnecessary.' 12
Additionally, as confirmed by international reports," 3 general conven-
tions,'' 4 domestic" 5 and international" 6 case law; state declarations,"' and
scholars;"' functional necessity is the prevailing standard, implying by
108. Preliminary Report on the Second Part of the Topic of Relations between States and
International Organizations, A/CN.4/304, 2 Yearbook of the ILC 139, 154 (1977)
109. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 94, 186; North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), supra note 27 para. 77.
110. D.B.MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 7(1971)
111. F.MORGERSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 3 (1986)
112. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 44th Session. Doc.
A/C.N.4/446, 297; Remarks by the Representative of Israel, Official Records of the General Assembly, 32nd
Session, Sixth Committee, 36th Meeting, para. 44; Remarks by the Representative of Spain, Official Records
of the General Assembly, 32nd Session, Sixth Committee, 39th Meeting, para. 16.
113. Resolution (69) 29 by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1969) &
Explanatory Report, supra note 101
114. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 57; Agreement
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of American States, 2 LTITP 377 (1949); General
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe (and additional Protocols), 250 UTS
12&32 (1949); General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity,
L.B.SOHN (ED.), BASIC DOCUMENTS OF AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 117(1971)
115. Cristiani v. Italian Latin-American Institute, Italian Court of Cassation, 87 ILR 20, 24-25;
Eckhardt v. European Organization for the Safety ofAir Navigation (Eurocontrol) No. 2, 94 ILR 331, 337-
338 (1987); Spaans v. Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 438 NJ 1691 (1985)
116. Reparations, supra note 60; Case C-2/88, IMM Zwartveld, E.C.J., (1990) E.C.R. 1-3365, para.
19.
117. Remarks by the Representative of Brazil, Official Records of the General Assembly, 32nd
Session, Sixth Committee, 30th Meeting, para. 40; Memorandum by the Government of the United Kingdom,
Foreign Office (1965). Para. 18; Reply to the Memorandum by the Government of the United Kingdom by
the Federal Republic of Germany, German Federal Foreign Office, June 25th (1965), para. 2; Reply to the
Memorandum by the Government of the United Kingdom by Norway, Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Aug. 10th (1965), para. 3 in Resolution (69) supra note 113.
118. G.WEISSBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1961); Dinh, Les
Privileges etlmmunites des Organismes Internationaux D 'Apres lesJurisprudences Nationales Depuis 1945,
3 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 262 (1957); 316; V.L.Maginnis, Limiting Diplomatic
Immunity: Lessons Learned from the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 989, 996 (2003); J.Groff, A Proposal for Diplomatic Accountability Using
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: The Decline of an Absolute Sovereign Right, 14
TEMP.INT L & COMP.L.J. 209, 216 (2000)
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definition, that consistent and uniform practice cannot be found for privileges
and immunities as it will reflect the particular needs and goals of each organiza-
tion.
Accordingly, while the constitutions of some organizations contain
immunity provisions of a very general nature," 9 others have very detailed
provisions12' and yet others have no provisions at all.' 2' Furthermore, States do
not consider themselves bound to recognize International Organizations any
minimum core of privileges and immunities for it is not necessary or
desirable. 2
2
In the absence of a customary rule, Respondents can only support their
claim on conventional basis. However, the A.A.A. merely devolves upon
general International Law to govern the matter, 23 and no international
customary rule has yet crystallized in this regard. Thus, Adaria did not violate
international law by its action in connection with the R.U. Legation.
3. In the alternative, customary international law would not apply to the
circumstances of this case.
a. If a customary obligation to vest International Organizations with
privileges and Immunities existed, it would only extend to
members of the RU.
Under international law, enjoyment of privileges and immunities in the
territory of non-member states remains dependent on agreement 24 --the sole
exception being the United Nations-and thus, if a customary rule existed, it
would solely bind members of the organization.'25
119. ILO Constitution, Oct. 9 15. U.N.T.S. 35 (1946) Art. 40; UNESCO Constitution, Art. XII; Nov.
16, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 (1945); WHO Constitution, July 22, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 (1946) Arts. 67&68; ICAO
Constitution, Dec. 7, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (1944) Art. 60.
120. IBRD Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 2 U.N.T.S 134 (1944), Art. VII; IMF Articles of
Agreement, Dec. 27, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (1945) Art IX; IFC Articles of Agreement, May 25, 264 U.N.T.S 117
(1955), Art. VI; MIGA Convention, Oct. 11, 1985 I.L.M 24 (1985), Arts. 43-50; EBRD Constitution, May
29, 1646 U.N.T.S 97 (1990), Arts. 46-55.
121. NATO Constitution; April 4,34 U.N.T.S. 243. (1949).
122. Explanatory Report, supra note 101, 14, 15&16.
123. AAA, supra note 105, §3
124. International Tin Council v. Amalgamet Inc., supra note 107; Iran-US Claims Tribunal v. AS,
94 ILR 321, 329 (1985)
125. P.DUPUY, A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 844 (1998) Communaute
economique des Etats de l'Afrique de I'Ouest and others v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International,
Paris Court of Appeal, 13th Jan. 1993, 120 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 353,357 (1993).
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Thus, as a non-member of the RU, Adaria owes no obligation to grant
privileges or immunities to the RU Representative Office under customary
international law.
b. If a customary obligation to vest International Organizations with
privileges and Immunities existed, it would only cover official acts.
Privileges and Immunities of international organizations are granted solely
to ensure the achievement of the entity's purposes, protecting it against undue
state intervention.
126
In this vein, privileges and immunities cease to be applicable when the
representative's conduct exceeds the scope of activities strictly necessary for
the administrative and technical operation of the Organization.'27 Tortious
acts, 128 bribery, 12 espionage,"' and fraudulent acts,' 3' are not official acts
attracting immunity, which must be interpreted restrictively having regard to the
limited character of the privileges and immunities normally accorded to them.132
The illegal financial contributions to political candidates performed by
Uriah Heep33 clearly exceeds his functions of facilitating Adarian integration
into the R.U., according to the A.A.A. Is4 Hence, privileges and immunities
need not be accorded to him or to the Organization in connection with those
acts.
4. Eventually, Adaria's conduct falls within a lawful exception to the
general rule of customary international law.
a. Privileges and Immunities do not apply as Adaria's national
security was at stake.
Organizations and their representatives must respect the laws of the state
in whose territory they conduct activities, without interfering with its internal
126. C.JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES, 17 (1961)
127. Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 NYS (2d) 31 (1946).
128. L v. The Crown, New Zealand Supreme Court, Sept. 12th, 1977, 68 ILR 175 (1985); United
States v. Coplon et aL, US District Court EDNY, May 10th, 1949.
129. Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim and others, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Feb. 1st, 1996,
1 LLOYD'S REPORTS 589, 596 (1996)
130. United States v. Melekh, 32 ILR 308 (1961)
131. Peoplev. Coumatos, 35 ILR 222 (1962)
132. Explanatory Report, supra note 10 1, 42.
133. Compromis #32.
134. Compromis, Annex, Section 3
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affairs.'35 Furthermore, every state retains the right to adopt necessary
precautions and measures in the interest of its security, 36particularly in cases
of flagrant and serious misconduct, for there would be no further cause for
protecting the international administration, since the acts involved are alien to
its nature. 13
7
The RU Office's illegal interference into the domestic politics of Adaria
compromised its national security, of which the political and electoral process
is a decisive factor. Thus, Adaria acted in accordance with international
standards, which entitles it to derogate privileges and immunities of the
Organization and its personnel where the national security of the State is at
stake.
D. The National Industry Act Does Not Constitute An Illegal Expropriation
OfAdarnoire And The Other Privatized Concerns Under International Law.
1. Respondents have not complied with the requirements for the exercise of
diplomatic protection with regard to the adardrink, adarenergy and adarfleet.
Local remedies must be exhausted before a State can bring a claim on
behalf of its nationals by virtue of diplomatic protection. 38 In the case at bar,
only Bobboman Inc. has exhausted Adarian local remedies. 39
There is no basis to believe that action by the other privatized concerns
would be futile. 4 ° Indeed, in order to find that the exhaustion of local remedies
is not required on such basis "the test is not whether a successful outcome is
likely or possible but whether the municipal system of the respondent State is
reasonably capable of providing effective relief'."' Clearly, Adaria is
reasonably capable of providing effective relief and the decision in Adarmoire
should not be considered as precluding that possibility since that decision is not
necessarily applicable to all other cases. Adarfleet, Adardrink and Adarenergy
135. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 U.N.T.S. 45 (April 18, 1965) Art. 41.1.
136. Explanatory Report, supra note 101, 21; ILC Summary Record of the 2232nd Meeting,
Relations between States and International Organizations (Second part of the topic), A/CN.A/438,
A/CN.4.439, A/CN.4/L.456, sect. F, A/CN.4/L.466, Draft Art. 17 (1991); European Launcher Development
Organisation (ELDO) Protocol, Feb. 29, 1964 U.K.T.S. 30 (1964) Art. 22 ; United States ex rel. Casanova
v. Fitzpatrick, 34 ILR 154, 159-160 (1963); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, 1 American Law Institute 524, §470, reporters' note 3 [hereinafter: Third Restatement].
137. A.PLANTEY, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE - LAW AND MANAGEMENT, 106 (1981).
138. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, supra note 58, 12; Nottebhom (Liech. v. Guat.), 19595
I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6), at 20; Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 21), at 27.
139. Compromis, #36; Clarifications, #9.
140. Clarifications #9.
141. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, Vol. 11, Part Two, 79.
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could very well argue the case different, or the fact of the cases be different, so
that a different outcome is achieved.
Consequently, respondents are precluded from espousing the claims of the
privatized concerns other than Adarmoire.
2. The National Industry Act does not constitute an illegal expropriation of
the privatized concerns.
a. Under international law only forcible takings ofproperty constitute an
expropriation and are thus illegal.
Under international law, direct expropriation is the forcible taking and
appropriation by the State of individuals' property by means of administrative
or legislative action.112
In the present case it is not possible to argue that an expropriation has
occurred because the foreign investors have retained property over the stocks
ofAdarmoire, Adardrink, Adarenergy and Adarfleet, which are still in existence
and whose value depends on the free market. '
b. General International Law does not deem as illegal measures other than
a forcible taking regardless of their effect on property rights.
There is no rule of customary law concerning other State measures that
produce an interference with the use of property or enjoyment of its benefits
when there is no formal transfer of property. 1"
The lack of uniformity in State practice regarding this subject is evidenced
in the disparity found in domestic legislation, in which States have subordinated
the right to private property to social interests. '45 Additionally, the fact that Free
142. A.MOURi, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN THE WORK OF THE
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBtNAL 65 (1994); I.BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003),
508-509; LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic
[hereinafter LG&E], ICSID Case N' ARB/02/01, 3 October 2006, para. 187; Amoco International Finance
Corporation v. Iran, 15 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 189 (1987), para. 108, 114; S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL Trib, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1440 (2003) para. 280; Trcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A.
v. United Mexican States [hereinafter Tecmed], ICSID, Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003, 43 I.L.M.
133, para. 113; Seismograph Service Corp v. Iranian National Oil Co. (1989), 22 IRAN-U.S. CL.TRIB.REP.
3, para. 267.
143. Compromis, #36.
144. OECD Working Paper on International Investment, No. 2004/4, "Indirect expropriation "and
the "right to regulate" in International Investment Law, 3, (Sept. 2004), at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf;
145. S.FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1981); BRAZ. CONSTITUTION, art. 5,
XXII; COSTARICACONSTITUTION, art. 45; PANAMA CONSTITUTION, art. 48; MEXICO CONSTITUTION, art. 27;
JAPAN CONSTITUTION art. 29(2).
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Trade Agreements 4 and Bilateral Investment Treaties 147 contemplate explicitly
these measures evinces that indirect expropriation does not form part of
customary international law. Furthermore, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had
the power to rule on "other measures affecting property rights" and grant com-
pensation solely because it was specially foreseen in its constitutive treaty. 48
Furthermore, the assertion that the National Industry Act [hereinafter
N.I.A] is "tantamount to expropiation,"'' 49 does not result in broadening the
ordinary meaning of expropriation, 50 because the ordinary meaning of the term
"tantamount" is that of being almost equivalent.
Therefore, there is no consolidated rule on indirect expropriation and the
N.I.A. is thus consistent with current international law.
c. In the alternative, the N.I.A. is consistent with General International Law
concerning indirect expropriations.
i. The N.I.A. does not produce the effects on property rights required to
deem it an indirect expropriation.
Even if indirect expropriation existed under international law, the
deprivation suffered in Adarmoire, Adarfleet, Adardrink and Adarenergy's
property rights is not enough to affirm that an expropriation has occurred.
Indeed, indirect expropriation occurs when the State in question effectively
neutralizes the benefits of the investment, by supervising the activities of the
company, taking the proceeds of its sales, interfering with its management or
appointing a manager or director.' The need of a significant degree of
deprivation, the fact that the property rights are rendered useless and the unjust
enrichment of the State, have all been deemed essential in determining the
existence of indirect expropriation.5 2
146. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec.17, 1992, Ch.l 1, art. 1110, 32 ILM 605 (1993);
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Mar. 3, 2004, art. 11.7(1); US-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
June 6,2003, art. 10.9(1); Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Dec.5, 1996, art. G-1 0(1)(a), 36 1.L.M. 1067.
147. 2004 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 6(1); United States-Turkey Bilateral
Investment Treaty, Dec. 3, 1985, art. III; United States-Poland Business and Economic Relations Treaty, Mar.
21, 1990, art. VII, at http://www.ustr.gov/.
148. Claims Settlement Declaration, January 19, 1981, Art. fl, 1 IRAN-U.S. CL.TRIB.REP. 9.
149. Compromis, #16.
150. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award (June 26,2000), para 96, www.naftaclaims.com;
S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, supra note 142, 1440.
151. Tecmed, supra note 142, para. 113; LG&E, supra note 142, para. 188; Pope & Talbot Inc. v.
Canada, supra note 150, para 100; OECD Working Paper on International Investment, supra note 144, 8.
152. E.Jimenez de Ar~chaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned
Property (1978), 11 N.Y.U.J.INT'L L.& POL. 179, 182; Sea-Land Service Inc v. Iran, 6 IRAN-
U.S.CL.TRIB.REc. 149, 161 (1984); Sporrong and Ldnnroth v. Sweeden, 5 E.H.R.R. 35 (1983) para. 63;
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In the case at bar, even if respondents argue that the value of the privatized
concerns in Adaria is affected, the Act does not prevent said companies from
directing their activities and enjoying its benefits within Adaria's territory.
Specifically, the denial of permission to transfer funds abroad does not
constitute taking of property under international law.'53 Accordingly, arbitral
tribunals have denied compensation for restrictions on international transfer of
funds 5 4 and restrictions on bank account transfers.' Additionally, it has been
found that conditions imposed upon the re-export of property were lawful and
not expropriation when the owner retained the right to sell the property." 6
It is clear that Adaria's Act does not amount to an indirect expropriation
because the companies' assets are in existence and at their disposal and
Adaria's Government has not interfered with the companies management.5 7
d In the further alternative, the N.A. constitutes
a valid regulatory measure.
It is a well accepted principle of customary law that all States have the
right to adopt regulatory measures, known as "an ordinary expression of the
exercise of the State's police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights "'58
as long as they are not discriminatory."' Both necessary elements for the
existence of customary law, State practice and opiniojuris,161 can be found.
Regarding State practice, domestic courts of Holand, the U.S.A., Sweden,
Great Britain and Germany have recognized the right of States to pass
Starret Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 IRAN-US CL. TiUB. REc. 122, 144-145 (1983); Tippets v. TAMS-AFFA
Consulting Engineers of Iran, 6 IRAN-U.S. CL.TRtB.REP. 219, 223 (1984); Tecmed, supra note 142, para.
115.
153. G.C.Christie, What constitutes a taking of property under international law?, 38
BRIT.Y.B.INT'L L. 307, (1962), 318; B.WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107
(1959).
154. Dallal v. Iran, 3 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 10; Hood Corporation v. Iran, 7 IRAN-U.S.CL.
TRIB.REP. 36.
155. Sea-Land Service Inc v. Iran, supra note 152.
156. Seismograph Service Corp v. Iranian National Oil Co., supra note 142, para. 301.
157. Compromis, #36.
158. Tecmed, supra note 142, para. 115.
159. I.BROWNLIE, supra note _142, 509; H.Burns Weston, "Constructive Takings" under
International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of "Creeping Expropriation", 16 VA.J. INT'L L. 104,
121 (1975-1976); G.C.Christie, supra note 153 331-332; Third Restatement, supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (g);
Oscar Chinn affaire, P.C.IJ, 1934, Ser A/B, Case No. 63; LG&E, supra note 142, para. 195.
160. North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 27, 45; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua, supra note 94, 97; H.Thirlway, The Sources on International Law, in M.EvANS(ED.),
INTERNATIONAL LAw 117, 125 (2003).
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regulatory measures and, when the decisions were against the Government
measures, it was only based on their discriminatory nature. 6 '
Evidence of existence of opinio juris can be drawn from instruments
approved by international organizations that affirm the power of States to pass
this kind of measures unless they withhold a clear intention of taking the
property by applying them 62 and the right of States to regulate foreign
investment and the activities oftransnational corporation within its territory "in
conformity with its national objectives and priorities."' 63 Furthermore, the
existence of this rule of customary international law is confirmed by the work
of prominent scholars. 164
i. The N.I.A. pursues a legitimate purpose.
Even if a measure carries some negative effects on property rights, it can
be validly adopted in order to protect public interests, such as health, morals,
safety or welfare. 65 In this vein, the N.I.A. is aimed to protect Adaria against
capital flight 66 and to minimize the damage caused by the closure of companies
and layoffs,'67 as well as at diminishing the impact on the Sophians. 6 The
N.I.A. was aimed at addressing the situation of a pauperized minority and can
therefore be considered to fulfill the requirement of pursuing a legitimate
purpose.
161. Weiss v. Simon (1919-1942 Supp.) Ann. Dig. 109 (No. 57) (Supreme Court, Sweden 1941);
Novello and Co., Ltd. v. Hinrichsen Edition, Ltd., (1951) 1 Ch. 595; Latvian Shipping Company v. Montan
Export Ltd., District Court of The Hague, (1950) I.L.R. 32; Kozicki v. Baltycka Spolka Rybna, Supreme
Court, Sweden, (1951) 1.L.R. 37; Molnar v. Wilsons A/B, Supreme Court, Sweden, (1954) I.L.R. 30;
Expropriation of Eastern Zone Company (Germany) Case, Supreme Court, Germany, (1955) I.L.R. 14.
162. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 2 1.L.M. 241 (1963), art. 3, cmt. 3.(a);
OECD Working Paper on International Investment, supra note 144, 8.
163. U.N.G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 Dec. 1974, 14 I.L.M. 251, Article 2.1l(a),(b).
164. Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 15 Apr.
1961, Article 10.5, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 554; Third Restatement, supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (g).
165. G.C.Christie, supra note 153, 338; Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property,
Article 3, 7 ILM 124 (1968); Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens, supra note 164, Article 10.5, 554; Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency Article I I(a)(ii), (1985) 24 I.L.M. 1605, 1611-1612; Oscar Chinn affaire, supra note 159.
166. Compromis, #35.
167. Compromis, #20.
168. Compromis, #21.
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ii. The N.I.A. is not discriminatory.
It is generally acknowledged that regulatory measures are not unreasonable
when they are not discriminatory.'69 Discrimination implies "unreasonable
distinction."''
70
In the present case, the N.I.A. affects only those companies which are
owned by R.U. nationals. However, the measure cannot be said to have been
aimed at those individuals in a discriminatory manner but rather it identified the
companies that were deemed essential for its economic development. 7 The
nationality of the shareholders was not taken into consideration when
distinguishing the concerns that would be targeted by the measure and thus the
N.I.A. cannot be considered as discriminatory.
iii. The N.I.A. is a temporary measure.
A temporary regulation of property rights cannot be seen as expropriation
but only as a mere delaying of an opportunity. 172 Only if the effect on the
property rights extended for a long period of time, the deprivation could be
considered as not merely ephemeral. 73
In the case at bar, Adaria's regulation was passed as a protection against
capital flight and with the intention of reducing the damages caused by the
denial of membership in the R.U. 174 thus being temporarily by definition.
Additionally, the freezing of the assets is a measure that can be reversed at any
time, given that the assets exist and the companies have retained ownership
over them.'75
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Therefore, it may please the Court to adjudge and declare:
A) That Respondents have violated international legal obligations
owed to Adaria by denying Adaria membership in the Rotian
Union;
169. Third Restatement, supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (g); North American Free Trade Agreement,
supra note 146; Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, supra note 165, Article 3.
170. Third Restatement, supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (f);
171. Compromis,#1
172. A.F.LoWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 480 (2003); S.D.Myers Inc. v. Canada,
supra note 142, 1440.
173. OECD Working Paper on International Investment, supra note 144, 14; Third Restatement,
supra note 136, § 712, cmt. (g).
174. Compromis, #35.
175. Compromis, #36.
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B) That Respondents do not have standing to make any claim
concerning Adaria's actions with respect to the Rotian Union
representative office, its property, or its personnel;
C) That Adaria did not violate international law concerning the
immunity of diplomatic missions by seizing the premises,
property, or personnel ofthe Rotian Union representative office;
D) The National Industry Act does not constitute an illegal
expropriation of Adarmoire and the other privatized concerns
under international law.
In respectful submission before the International Court of Justice, The Republic
of Adaria
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